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Abstract
Scholars have assumed that trust is fragile: difficult to build and easily broken. We demonstrate,
however, that in some cases trust is surprisingly robust—even when harmful deception is
revealed, some individuals maintain high levels of trust in the deceiver. In this paper, we
describe how implicit theories moderate the harmful effects of revealed deception on a key
component of trust: perceptions of integrity. In a negotiation context, we show that people who
hold incremental theories (beliefs that negotiating abilities are malleable) reduce perceptions of
their counterpart’s integrity after they learn that they were deceived, whereas people who hold
entity theories (beliefs that negotiators’ characteristics and abilities are fixed) maintain their first
impressions after learning that they were deceived. Implicit theories influenced how targets
interpreted evidence of deception. Individuals with incremental theories encoded revealed
deception as an ethical violation; individuals with entity theories did not. These findings
highlight the importance of implicit beliefs in understanding how trust changes over time.
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Trust enables social groups, organizations and economic systems to operate effectively
(Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Fukuyama, 1996; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). At the same time,
individuals, groups, and organizations routinely engage in actions that violate trust (Elangovan &
Shapiro, 1998). Despite the importance of trust and the frequency with which trust is violated,
we know little about how trust changes over time. In particular, we know very little about how
trust is harmed by violations (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper & Dirks, 2004; Schoorman, Mayer & Davis,
2007; Schweitzer, Hershey & Bradlow, 2006).
Prior research has assumed that trust is fragile: slow to build and easy to break. In several
theoretical articles, scholars have postulated that trust violations substantially and irreparably
harm trust (e.g., Kramer, 1996; Lewicki, 2006; Boyle & Bonacich, 1970). However, empirical
work investigating trust erosion, or whether and how trust is lost following a transgression
(Elangovan, Auer-Rizzi, & Szabo, 2007), remains scarce.
Perceptions of trustworthiness precede trust judgments and are rooted in perceptions of
ability, benevolence and integrity (Mayer & Davis, 1999; Mayer et al., 1995). Different types of
actions can independently affirm or violate different dimensions of trust (Kim et al., 2004). In
this paper, we focus on violations of integrity (i.e., departures from socially-accepted morals or
principles; Kim et al., 2004; Mayer et al., 1995), which are directly linked with deception and
trust (Levine & Schweitzer, 2015). We describe how perceived integrity changes following
deception, and adopt the term trust erosion to refer to a decrease in perceived integrity. We
challenge prior theoretical work by demonstrating that in some cases, transgressions harm
assessments of a counterpart’s integrity very little. In particular, we argue that individual
differences in implicit theories about the stability of human nature influence the attributions
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people make for the behavior they observe, and these theories moderate the relationship between
trust violations and trust erosion.
By exploring the relationships among implicit theories and reactions to being deceived,
we extend theory and research in a number of important ways. Whereas previous work on
dynamic trust has focused primarily on how trust can be rebuilt following extreme and repeated
violations (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Schweitzer, Hershey & Bradlow,
2006; Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan & Murnighan, 2008), the current research examines the
conditions under, and the extent to which, perceived integrity might erode in the first place. We
highlight the social-cognitive underpinnings of trust, and demonstrate how the implicit theories
of perceivers are a critical factor in determining how they respond to untrustworthy behavior.
Implicit Theories
Individuals hold implicit theories about the fixedness or malleability of key attributes,
such as intelligence and leadership (Dweck, 1996). Some people believe that even the most basic
qualities that characterize a person can be changed through effort and hard work (incremental or
malleable implicit theories), while others believe that basic qualities cannot change over time
(entity or fixed theories; Chiu, Hong & Dweck, 1997; Dweck et al., 1993; Dweck & Leggett,
1988). Although implicit theories are rarely articulated and often operate below the level of
conscious awareness, they can exert powerful effects on affect, cognition, and behavior (e.g.,
Heslin, VandeWalle & Latham, 2006; Hong et al., 1997). For instance, entity theories promote
stereotyping by leading individuals to characterize others as immutably situated within a
socially-defined category (Levy, Stroessner & Dweck, 1998), and implicit negotiation theories
affect negotiators’ ability to create and claim value and to extract valuable lessons from prior
negotiations (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007; Wong, Haselhuhn & Kray, 2011).
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Though implicit theories are often studied as stable, trait-like individual characteristics
(e.g., Heslin et al., 2006), several studies demonstrate that implicit theories can be manipulated
situationally. Simple inductions, such as reading an essay espousing either an incremental or
entity view, can influence the implicit theories that people hold (e.g., Bergen, 1992; Chiu et al.,
1997; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). The labile nature of implicit theories is particularly relevant in
an applied context—actors may wish to shift the implicit theories of others in order to achieve
specific goals. For example, managers may wish to induce incremental implicit negotiation
theories in their employees in order to make them more effective negotiators (Kray &
Haselhuhn, 2007).
Importantly, implicit theories affect the attributions people make for others’ behavior.
Entity theorists view people in terms of fixed traits (i.e., people cannot change). Incremental
theorists are more likely to believe that situational moderators influence behavior (Dweck, Chiu
& Hong, 1995; Dweck, Hong & Chiu, 1993). For instance, Hong et al. (1999) found that entity
theorists attributed negative outcomes (e.g., poor test performance) to stable traits (e.g., innate
ability), whereas incremental theorists attributed these negative outcomes to both stable and
changeable factors, such as effort.
Because entity theorists believe that behavior stems from stable, underlying traits, they
place a great deal of weight on even limited information about others and believe that this
information has substantial predictive power (Dweck et al., 1993). For example, Chiu et al.
(1997b) found that, relative to incremental theorists, entity theorists believed that a single
observation of a behavior (e.g., being friendly or honest) suggested a high probability that the
person would exhibit the same behavior in a completely different situation.
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These findings suggest that initial impressions are very important for entity theorists, as
these initial impressions are difficult to change. This is true even when entity theorists receive
disconfirming evidence. Whereas incremental theorists attend equally to belief-confirming and
belief-disconfirming information, entity theorists tend to focus primarily on information that
confirms held beliefs about an individual or group (Plaks et al., 2001). For instance, Gervey et al.
(1999) examined how implicit theories affected jury decisions in a fictional court case. Entity
theorists based their verdicts primarily on the initial positive or negative surface descriptions of
the defendant, largely ignoring whether the evidence supported this judgment. Incremental
theorists, on the other hand, based their verdicts on the quality of the total body of evidence,
regardless of their initial perceptions.
Similarly, Heslin et al. (2005) found that, in an organizational context, supervisors who
held entity theories were slower to update initial perceptions of their subordinates (either positive
or negative) in the face of new information suggesting that the subordinate’s performance had
changed. Plaks, Grant & Dweck (2005) argued that entity theorists avoid or attempt to debunk
belief-inconsistent information not only because they believe it less likely to be true, but also
because if it were to be true, it would violate their most basic beliefs that people cannot really
change.
In sum, implicit theories have been shown to influence the knowledge people believe
they have about others. Entity theorists believe that they can learn a great deal about other people
from even single observations. They expect behaviors and attitudes to remain stable over time
and across varied contexts, and are resistant to information that suggests that their initial
impressions may have been incorrect. Incremental theorists, on the other hand, are more likely to
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attribute observed behaviors to situational forces, and are therefore receptive to information that
either confirms or disconfirms their initial perceptions of others.
Implicit Theories and Trust Erosion
Entity theorists are motivated to see the world as stable and dispositional (Plaks et al.,
2005). As a result, entity theorists are quick to reach conclusions about people’s basic
characteristics (e.g., trustworthiness) and slow to update these perceptions when they learn new
information (Heslin et al., 2005). When exposed to belief-inconsistent information, entity
theorists engage in biased processing by undervaluing information that contradicts their beliefs.
As a result, we expect first impressions of integrity to be particularly enduring for entity
theorists. For example, if an entity theorists believes someone to have high integrity, we expect
them to discount the importance of a trust violation and other belief-inconsistent information (cf.
Robinson, 1996). That is, we expect entity theorists to engage in biased and motivated
information processing (e.g., Kunda, 1990) to preserve their initial impressions of a counterpart.
Conversely, we expect incremental theorists to be more likely to revise their beliefs.
Compared to entity theorists, incremental theorists are more attentive to both belief-consistent
and belief-inconsistent information and, as a result, are more likely to incorporate trust violations
in their assessments and update their perceptions of a counterparts’ integrity. In sum, we expect
incremental theorists’ perceptions of a counterpart, in contrast to an entity theorists’ perceptions,
to decline more quickly following a trust violation. As a result, we expect incrementalists to be
more accurate in processing belief-inconsistent information than entity theorists.
Taken together, implicit theories are likely to influence trust erosion in two ways. First,
entity theorists are less likely to recognize objective violations of trust. Second, even when
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controlling for differences in perceptions of trust violations, entity theorists experience less trust
erosion than will incremental theorists. Formally, we hypothesize:
H1: Entity theorists will experience less trust erosion following deception than will
incremental theorists.
H2: Entity theorists will ignore or discount information that is inconsistent with their
initial beliefs regarding perceptions of a counterpart’s integrity.
H3: Biased processing of belief-inconsistent information will mediate the relationship
between implicit theories and trust erosion.
In our studies, we describe how deception affects perceived integrity within the domain
of negotiations. Although trust benefits negotiators by enabling participants to share information
and reach efficient, integrative outcomes (Bazerman, 2006; Butler, 1999; Kimmel et al., 1980;
Lewicki, 2006; Maddux, Mullen & Galinsky, 2008; Thompson, 1991), negotiators routinely
engage in deception to gain leverage and claim additional surplus (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2012; Lax
& Sebenius, 1986; O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997; Schweitzer, 2001; Schweitzer & Croson,
1999). Because negotiator reputations are only loosely tied to their history of behavior (Anderson
& Shirako, 2008), negotiations are a perfect context for examining whether implicit theories
influence the degree to which perceived integrity is informed by actual behavior. We measure
negotiators’ perceptions of their counterpart both before and after being deceived, and describe
the effects of deception on perceived integrity and demonstrate that implicit theories moderate
this relationship.
Study 1
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We examine the relationship between deception and integrity perceptions in a negotiation
context. Domain-specific implicit beliefs can substantially influence both judgment and behavior
(Hong et al., 1997; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007; Tamir et al., 2007), and in this study we focus on
implicit negotiation theories (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2012). Implicit
negotiation theories characterize the view that people either can or cannot change their most
basic negotiation characteristics, such as how they approach conflict situations.
In this study, we consider the role of implicit negotiation theories in moderating reactions
to revealed deception. We expect people who hold entity theories, beliefs that negotiation
characteristics are fixed, to fail to integrate new information. Specifically, compared to people
who have incremental theories, we expect people who hold entity theories to maintain initial
perceptions of their counterpart’s high integrity even after they learn that their counterpart
engaged in deception.
Method
Participants
Ninety-four MBA students at an East Coast university participated in a negotiation as
part of a class exercise. We randomly assigned participants to either a buyer or seller role and to
one of two implicit negotiation theory inductions: incremental theories (malleable beliefs) or
entity theories (fixed beliefs) in a fully crossed design. Buyers and sellers were randomly
assigned to negotiating dyads (n = 47), with the qualification that partners had not previously
negotiated with one another.1
Materials and Procedure
The negotiation involved five stages. First, one week before the experiment, participants
were given negotiation materials regarding the potential sale of a property to prepare in advance.

10
The negotiation exercise, detailed below, creates the opportunity and incentive for buyers to
mislead their counterpart. After preparing for the negotiation, participants completed the
remainder of the experiment via computer.
Second, we manipulated negotiator implicit theories (described below). Third, we gave
participants 80 minutes to negotiate. Fourth, after negotiating participants completed a postnegotiation survey to assess their perceptions of their counterpart’s integrity and whether they
thought they had been deceived. Following this survey, we informed sellers about the buyers’
real intentions. In almost every case, this information revealed to sellers that their buyer
counterpart had deceived them. Fifth, participants completed a final survey to assess perceptions
of their counterpart and whether they thought they had been deceived. We tested our hypotheses
by examining how sellers’ perceptions of their counterparts’ integrity changed after learning of
their counterparts’ deception.
Implicit negotiation theory manipulation. Though we were primarily interested in seller
reactions to deception, we randomly and independently assigned both buyers and sellers to the
entity or the incremental negotiation theory condition.2
We manipulated implicit theories with the Kray and Haselhuhn (2007) induction. We
chose to manipulate, rather than measure, implicit theories in order to establish the causal
relationship between implicit theories and trust erosion. Prior to negotiating, participants read
either the entity or the incremental version of an induction essay. We informed participants that
reading this essay would help “put them in a negotiation frame of mind.” The incremental theory
version of the essay included reports from fictitious studies supporting the position that people
can change who they are as negotiators. Sample statements from the essay include “no one’s
negotiation character is hard like a rock that cannot be changed,” and “a voluminous body of
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evidence indicates that the manner in which people approach conflict situations is changeable.”
The entity theory version of the essay endorsed the position that negotiators’ characteristics are
relatively fixed. Sample statements include “people gain experience and develop in negotiations,
but they do so on the foundation of enduring dispositions,” and “a voluminous body of evidence
indicates that the manner in which people approach conflict situations is not changeable.”
Negotiation exercise. We modified the Bullard Houses negotiation case (Karp, Gold &
Tan, 2006) to make the issue of deception unambiguous. This exercise involves a seller
interested in selling a property to a buyer only if the buyer can guarantee that the property will be
preserved, and a buyer who is unwilling to make any guarantees. This exercise is characterized
by a positive bargaining zone in terms of financial concerns, but a negative bargaining zone in
terms of each party’s underlying interests. Agreement is very difficult to reach, and only 14 of
the 47 dyads reached an agreement within the allotted time. In our modified version of this
exercise, it was very clear to sellers that they would only be willing to sell the property if it
would be preserved and not developed for commercial use. It was equally clear to buyers that
they were only interested in developing the property for commercial use. We informed buyers
that they were not allowed to reveal their intentions for the property (the planned construction of
a hotel).
Two research assistants who were blind to hypotheses and conditions coded buyer
deception from the transcripts of the negotiation; inter-rater agreement was adequate (κ = .56). In
44 of the 47 transcripts (94%), at least one rater noted that the buyer had engaged in deception.
The pattern and significance of the results remain unchanged when including or excluding
participants who experienced no deception. The analyses presented below were conducted with
data excluding those who did not experience deception.
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Perceived deception. Consistent with prior deception research (Barry, 1999; Lewicki,
1983), we asked sellers to rate the extent to which their counterpart had misrepresented their
bottom line, preferences, emotions, intentions, and material facts (1: Definitely misrepresented,
5: Definitely did not misrepresent). We asked sellers to complete this scale both immediately
following the negotiation (α = .94) and after we revealed buyers’ true intentions (α = .94). In
subsequent analyses, we report results from the average of the five items, and we reverse-scored
responses so that higher numbers indicate greater perceived deception.
Perceived integrity. We measured the integrity component of trust (Mayer et al., 1995)
using a three item scale adapted from Kim et al. (2004). We collected this measure both
immediately following the negotiation (α = .93) and after we revealed the buyers’ true intentions
(α = .95). Specifically, participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with the following
three statements: I like my counterpart’s values; Sound principles seem to guide my
counterpart’s behavior; My counterpart has a great deal of integrity (1: Strongly disagree, 7:
Strongly agree).
Pilot study
We conducted a pilot study with a separate population to test whether our induction
would hold after 80 minutes of intense negotiation.3 We recruited 68 undergraduate students to
participate for extra course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to read the incremental
theory manipulation essay (n = 30) or the entity theory manipulation essay (n = 38). Two days
later, participants completed a 7-item scale that measures beliefs about the malleability of
negotiator characteristics (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). Sample items include “good negotiators are
born that way” and “all people can change even their most basic negotiator characteristics” (1:
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Very strongly disagree, 7: Very strongly agree). Higher scores indicate greater incremental
theories (α = .76).
Results of a one-way ANOVA showed that participants in the incremental theory
condition (M = 5.41, SD = .59) held significantly more malleable theories compared to those in
the entity theory condition (M = 4.44, SD = .87), F(1, 66) = 27.50, p < .001. These results
suggest that the simple induction employed in our research holds after a significant period of
time.
Results and Discussion
Initial integrity perceptions. Deception is generally difficult to detect (Ekman &
O’Sullivan, 1991). Consistent with this previous work, sellers’ perceptions of integrity
immediately following the negotiation did not correlate with buyers’ deception (r(44) = -.11, ns);
even though all buyers engaged in deception, sellers initially reported moderate levels of
perceived integrity in their counterpart, (M = 4.20, SD = 0.18). In a regression modeling seller
initial integrity perceptions as a function of seller theories and buyer theories, we found no
significant main or interaction effects.
Perceived deception. We predicted that implicit theories would moderate reactions to
potentially untrustworthy actions, such that entity theorists would be less likely to perceive a
trusted counterpart’s actions as deceptive. To test this prediction, we conducted a mixed-model
ANOVA with perceived deception as the dependent measure, implicit theories as a betweensubjects factor, and time (before or after the deception was revealed) as a within-subject factor.
We first observed a significant main effect of time, such that buyers were perceived as
less deceptive immediately following the negotiation (M = 2.69, SD= 0.89) than they were after
we revealed the buyer’s true intentions (M = 3.28, SD = 1.22), F(1, 42) = 14.13, p = .001. This
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main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between implicit theories and time, F(1, 42)
= 7.16, p = .01. After we revealed the buyers’ true intentions, participants in the incremental
theory condition were significantly more likely to perceive that they had been deceived by their
counterpart (Ms = 2.52 vs. 3.61, SDs = 1.10 and 1.19), F(1, 19) = 15.83, p = .001; perceived
deception did not significantly differ across time for participants in the entity theory condition
(Ms = 2.83 vs. 3.01, SDs = 0.65 and 1.21), F(1, 23) = .77, ns (see Figure 1). Entity theorists and
incremental theorists did not significantly differ in either their initial perceptions (F(1, 42) =
1.30, p = .26), nor their perceptions following the revealed deception, F(1, 42) = 2.75, p = .11.
These results supported Hypothesis 2.
Perceived integrity. We hypothesized that entity theorists’ failure to recognize deceptive
behavior would lead them to experience less trust erosion compared to incremental theorists. To
test this prediction, we conducted a mixed-model ANOVA with implicit theories as a betweensubjects factor and time (before or after the deception was revealed) as a within-subject factor.
This analysis first revealed a significant main effect of time, such that perceptions of
integrity were significantly higher immediately after the negotiation (M = 4.20, SD = 1.18)
compared to after the buyers’ true intentions were revealed (M = 3.42, SD = 1.36), F(1, 42) =
19.84, p < .001. However, consistent with our hypothesis, this main effect was qualified by a
significant interaction between implicit theories and time (see Figure 2), F(1, 42) = 11.78, p =
.001. Participants in the incremental theory condition perceived significantly less integrity after
the buyers’ true intentions were revealed (Ms = 4.47 vs. 2.97, SDs = 1.33 and 1.31), F(1, 19) =
18.81, p < .001. In contrast, participants in the entity theory condition did not change their
perceptions after the information was revealed, (Ms = 3.99 vs. 3.79, SDs = 1.02 and 1.31), F(1,
23) = 1.00, ns. Similarly, whereas our preliminary analyses showed no differences in initial
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perceptions of integrity between entity and incremental theorists (F(1, 42) = 1.84, p = .18), after
we revealed the buyers’ true intentions, participants in the incremental condition perceived
significantly less integrity in their counterparts than did participants in the entity condition, F(1,
42) = 4.34, p = .04. This analysis supported Hypothesis 1.
We next tested the mediating role of perceived deception on trust erosion after the
buyers’ deception was revealed. We included measures of perceived integrity and perceived
deception immediately following the negotiation as controls in all analyses. To test for
mediation, we conducted bias-corrected bootstrapping analyses with 10,000 resamples (Preacher
& Hayes, 2008). This analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of the implicit theory
induction, Mediated effect = -.58, SE = .26, 95% CI = -1.19 ‒ -.16. As the confidence interval
does not bridge zero, this analysis supports our conclusion that perceived deception mediated the
relationship between implicit theories and trust erosion, consistent with Hypothesis 3.
We also conducted supplemental analyses to explore the relationship between implicit
theories and trust erosion. Specifically, we examined whether entity theorists’ higher perceived
integrity after a trust violation results from their lower perceived deception. To do so, we
constructed difference scores for the perceived integrity and perceived deception measures by
subtracting the respective scores at Time 1 from scores at Time 2. We then tested whether the
perceived deception score mediated the relationship between implicit theories and the perceived
integrity score. Consistent with our previous results, we found a significant indirect effect of
implicit theories, Mediated effect = -.53, SE = .25, 95% CI = -1.16 ‒ -.15.
These findings support Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. Individuals’ theories regarding the
fixedness of negotiator characteristics moderated responses to deception. In particular, by
inducing entity theories, individuals maintained perceptions of integrity in a negotiation
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counterpart even after learning of the counterpart’s deceitful behavior. In contrast, by inducing
incremental theories, individuals reduced perceptions of integrity in their counterparts after
learning that their counterpart had been deceitful. By manipulating, rather than measuring,
implicit negotiation theories, we were able to establish a causal relationship between implicit
theories and trust erosion.
Intriguingly, perceived deception mediated the relationship between implicit theories and
trust erosion. Whereas individuals in the incremental theory condition recognized that they had
been deceived when they learned their counterparts’ true intentions, individuals in the entity
theory condition did not update their beliefs about the other party in the face of the new
information. Even though sellers in both conditions were deceived, those with entity theories
may have ignored or discounted the belief-inconsistent information.
Taken together, our findings link implicit theories, deception, and trust erosion. However,
our study did not address how individuals process belief-inconsistent information. When
confronted with new information, individuals motivated to maintain their current beliefs may
either disregard the new information or discount the importance of the new information. For
example, in our study, entity theorists could either ignore new information about buyers’
intentions or they might encode their counterpart’s misrepresentations as part of a negotiation
process, and hence not a serious violation, rather than judge their counterpart to have committed
an ethical violation. Kray and Haselhuhn (2012) found negotiators holding entity theories report
lower ethical standards than incremental theorists, suggesting the former may be less likely than
the latter to judge the identical behavior as unethical. To disentangle these potential explanations,
we conducted a second study to explore how entity theorists process and integrate new
information that conflicts with previously held beliefs.
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We extend our investigation in Study 2 in two other respects as well. First, Study 2
examined the relation between implicit theories and trust using a larger sample. Second, we
address the potential concern that the implicit theory induction we used in Study 1 may fade over
time. Though similar implicit theory inductions have resulted in long-lasting effects in other
studies (see Haselhuhn, Schweitzer & Wood, 2010; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007), and our pilot
results suggest that our manipulation is durable, we address concerns regarding the robustness of
the implicit theory-trust erosion relationship in Study 2. Specifically, we establish convergent
validity by measuring naturally-occurring individual differences in implicit theories, rather than
inducing particular beliefs.
Study 2
In Study 2, we extend our investigation by examining whether incremental theorists and
entity theorists differentially attend to untrustworthy behavior (Hypothesis 2). Specifically, we
examine whether implicit theories predict the degree to which behavior affects ethical
attributions for a counterpart’s actions, and subsequently informs perceived integrity. In addition,
in contrast to Study 1, this study measures rather than manipulates implicit theories. This
approach enables us to determine whether naturally-occurring individual differences in implicit
theories influence trust erosion.
Method
Participants
We recruited 258 U.S. participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk, and we paid
individuals $.75 for their participation.
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Materials and Procedure
First, we measured participants’ implicit negotiation theories. Then, we asked
participants to read a scenario about purchasing a used computer. After learning about the
computer, participants read the following information:
You arrange a meeting with the seller and see that the computer is very clean and has
been well maintained. You ask the seller if he has had any issues with the computer, and
he assures you that the computer is in perfect working order. You decide to purchase the
computer.
Following the initial scenario, participants rated the seller’s perceived integrity (see details
below).
After recording their initial impressions, participants received updated information that
suggests that the seller engaged in deception. Specifically, participants were told:
After using the computer for a few weeks, you find that the hard drive acts like it
is about to fail, and the computer occasionally crashes without warning. When
you take the computer to a local repair shop, the salesperson pulls up a repair
record for the computer and notes that it was brought to the shop just last month
with similar issues.
After reading the new information, participants once again rated the seller’s perceived integrity
and also stated their beliefs regarding the seller’s motives in the interaction.
Implicit negotiation theories. Before providing participants with the scenario, we
administered Kray and Haselhuhn’s (2007) implicit negotiation theory scale (α = .86).
Perceived integrity. We once again measured the integrity component of trust (Mayer et
al., 1995) using the 3-item scale adapted from Kim et al. (2004). Reliability was adequate for
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both initial perceptions of integrity (α = .88) and perceptions of integrity after the updated
information was revealed (α = .93).
Ethical attributions for seller behavior. We asked participants to assess the seller’s
motives by responding to the following open-ended question, “In your own words, how would
you explain the Seller’s approach to the transaction?” Two research assistants who were blind to
the study hypotheses coded responses based upon whether or not the participant specifically
described the seller’s behavior using words related to ethics or morality (e.g., lying, cheating,
immoral, deceitful). Examples of motives including such rationale (coded as 1) included: “It was
dishonest and ethically wrong,” and “He was lying and didn’t care what he had to do to get rid of
a computer.” Examples of responses that did not include specific reference to ethical or moral
considerations (coded as 0) included: “He was a guy who wanted to get rid of a computer. He
probably thought the issue was fixed but still wanted to get rid of it just in case,” and “The seller
approached the transaction well making me feel secure enough to buy.” Inter-rater reliability was
adequate (κ = .69) and disagreements were resolved by a third research assistant.
Results
Preliminary analyses. Our predictions are predicated on the assumption that individuals
will initially trust their counterparts following the transaction. Indeed, participants reported a
moderately high level of perceived integrity following the first part of the scenario (M = 5.15, SD
= 0.88 on a 7-point scale).
Trust erosion. Correlations between all variables are presented in Table 1. We conducted
a repeated-measures ANOVA to investigate perceived integrity before and after ethicallyquestionable information about the transaction was revealed. To test the role of implicit
negotiation theories in this process, we included implicit theories as a continuous predictor. This

20
analysis first revealed a significant main effect of time. Perceived integrity was significantly
greater immediately following the transaction (M = 5.15, SD = 0.88) compared to after the
seller’s deceptive behavior was revealed (M = 1.74, SD = 0.98), F(1, 256) = 30.99, p < .001. This
main effect for time was qualified by a significant interaction with implicit theories, F(1, 256) =
8.07, p = .005. To explore this interaction, we correlated implicit theories with perceptions of
integrity before and after the history of the computer was revealed. We found no significant
relationship between implicit theories and initial perceptions of integrity, r(258) = .10, p = .12.
However, we find a significant negative relationship between implicit theories and perceptions of
integrity after we revealed the new information (r(258) = -.14, p = .02); individuals with entity
theories perceived more integrity in their counterpart following deception than did individuals
with incremental theories.
Ethical attributions for seller behavior. Most (74%) participants explained the seller’s
behavior in ethical terms compared to more benign interpretations of behavior, χ2(1, N = 258) =
57.69, p < .001. We tested the relationship between implicit beliefs and attributions about the
seller’s behavior using logistic regression. Individuals with stronger entity theories were less
likely to explain the seller’s actions in terms of ethics or morality than were individuals with
incremental theories, b = .30, SE = .15, Wald χ2(1, N = 258) = 4.34, p = .037.
We next tested the potential mediating role of ethical attributions on trust erosion using
bias-corrected bootstrapping analyses with 10,000 resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).
Specifically, we examined whether ethical attributions mediated the relationship between
implicit negotiation theories and perceptions of integrity after the seller’s actions were revealed
(controlling for levels of initial perceptions following the transaction). This analysis revealed a
significant indirect effect of implicit theories, Mediated effect = -.04, SE = .02, 95% CI = -.10 ‒ -
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.004. As the confidence interval does not bridge zero, this analysis supports our conclusion that
ethical attributions mediated the relationship between implicit theories and trust erosion. As a
supplemental analysis, we once again constructed a difference score by subtracting perceived
integrity at Time 1 from perceived integrity at Time 2, and determining whether ethical
attributions mediated the relationship between implicit theories and this variable. Consistent with
our other mediation results, we found a significant indirect effect of implicit theories, Mediated
effect = -.05, SE = .02, 95% CI = -.11 ‒ -.02.
General Discussion
In this paper, we demonstrate that implicit negotiation theories moderate trust erosion. In
Study 1 we induced entity (fixed) or incremental (malleable) theories and in Study 2 we
measured these theories. We then assessed the extent to which these theories influenced
perceived integrity over time. Even though participants who held both entity and incremental
theories were deceived to similar degrees, participants with incremental theories perceived
significantly less integrity in their counterparts following the revelation that their counterpart had
deceived them. In contrast, people with entity theories maintained their positive perceptions,
even after learning of their counterpart’s deception. Ethical attributions mediated the relationship
between implicit theories and trust erosion. People who held entity theories failed to see a
counterpart’s deceptive behavior as revealing their integrity; people who held incremental
theories were more likely to view their counterpart as deceitful after learning new information.
Our findings demonstrate that the relationship between deception and trust erosion is
more complicated than theoretical models of trust erosion have assumed. Not only is it possible
for deception to cause surprisingly little harm to trust, but individual differences in general, and
implicit theories in particular, also substantially influence trust erosion.
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Our findings regarding the complexity of the relationship between deception and
perceptions of integrity are consistent with some prior work. For example, Elangovan et al.
(2007) found that perceived intentions matter. When victims attribute violations to intentional
behavior, trust is harmed significantly more than when the same behavior is attributed to the
inability of the violator to fulfill expectations. In related work, Robinson (1996) found that initial
levels of trust moderate the harmful effects of a violation.
Although our current work focuses on how initially high levels of perceived integrity
may change over time, our findings could extend to cases in which initial trust is low (e.g., at the
beginning of a relationship or after trust has been blatantly violated). Haselhuhn et al. (2010)
found that people who hold entity theories (and assume that people cannot readily change) are
not very responsive to transgressor’s attempts to repair trust (e.g., apologies, explanations of
previous behavior, promises that behavior will change in the future). In contrast, people who
hold incremental theories are relatively receptive to a transgressor’s attempts to rebuild trust.
Our research also has practical implications for individuals and organizations. In practice,
people are likely to violate trust both intentionally and unintentionally, and our findings suggest
that violators may not suffer distrust after deceiving entity theorists. To avoid exploitation,
individuals may need to manage others’ impressions of their implicit theories as transgressors
may be best able to maintain relationships with others by inducing entity theories in their
counterpart before committing (or revealing) untrustworthy actions. Similarly, transgressors may
regain trust most effectively by inducing incremental theories in their counterpart prior to taking
a trust recovery action (e.g., making an apology). Thus, individuals should be aware of how their
own implicit theories shape their perceptions of and reactions to others.
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Our research also complements previous work highlighting the benefits of encouraging
incremental theories in organizational and business settings. For example, managers with
incremental theories are more likely than those with entity theories to reward improvement in
subordinates’ performance (Heslin et al., 2005) and to work with subordinates to overcome
performance issues in the workplace (Heslin et al., 2006). Similarly, incremental theories lead
negotiators to persevere in the face of challenges (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007), to overcome
negative stereotypes that impede success in strategic interactions (Kray, Locke & Haselhuhn,
2009), and to avoid the use of unethical actions at the bargaining table (Kray & Haselhuhn,
2012). Our work does not challenge the benefits of fomenting incremental theories within
organizations, but rather builds understanding of the full implications of incremental theories.
Trust is a critical element of efficient organizational behavior (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Fukuyama,
1996) and incremental theories may lead to greater fluctuations of trust among organizational
members. Our work suggests that leaders who encourage incremental theories within
organizations should also consider instituting measures specifically dedicated to maintaining
high levels of trust in the workplace.
We have situated our work in literature that suggests entity theorists fixate on early
impressions of others. Future work could explore other potential mechanisms by which implicit
theories relate to trust dynamics. For example, stronger endorsement of entity theories is
associated with greater acceptance of ethically-questionable negotiation tactics, including
deception (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2012). It is possible that because entity theorists see deception as
more acceptable, they view deceptive behavior as less reflective of a counterpart’s integrity.
Future research should further examine the potential links among implicit theories, ethics and
trust.
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Future research should also study boundary conditions of the effects we identify in this
work. For instance, future work should explore how implicit beliefs relate to trust erosion after
repeated violations. We examined a single instance of untrustworthy behavior and found that
entity theorists maintained beliefs consistent with their initial perceptions of integrity. Following
repeated violations, however, entity theorists may revise their initial perceptions to perceive a
counterpart as a particularly untrustworthy individual. Ultimately, these revised perceptions may
be resilient in the face of subsequent apologies and future trustworthy behavior.
Conclusion
Although prior work has assumed that trust is fragile and easily shattered, our work
demonstrates that, at least in some cases, trust is remarkably robust. We demonstrate that implicit
negotiation theories influence how people react to revealed deception. People who hold
incremental theories about negotiators reduce perceived integrity in their counterpart after being
deceived more readily than people who hold entity theories about negotiators. In contrast, people
who hold entity theories are relatively unlikely to acknowledge that a trust violation has
occurred. Our results offer important insight into the social-cognitive basis of trust, and call for
increased research into the links between implicit theories and trust. How trust erodes may have
more to do with the implicit theories of the target than the transgression itself.
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Footnotes
1

We note that though participants had never negotiated with one another prior to this

exercise, it is possible that initial impressions may have developed from previous interactions.
2

Buyers’ theories were not significantly related to any of the dependent measures and we

focus on sellers’ theories in the remaining analyses and discussion.
3

We thank an anonymous reviewer for noting the importance of establishing the

durability of the implicit theory manipulation over time.
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Table 1
Study 2: Correlations Between Variables
Variable

1

2

3

1. Implicit negotiation theories

--

2. Integrity perceptions (Time 1)

.10

--

3. Integrity perceptions (Time 2)

-.14

.02

--

4. Ethical attributions (0 = no ethical attribution; 1 = ethical attribution)

-.13

-.05

.32

Note: Significant correlations (p < .05) are in boldface.

4

--

Figure 1: Perceived deception as a function of implicit negotiation theories
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Figure 2: Integrity-based trust following deception

